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A Somewhat Altered Debate about the Hypnotic State
Sixteen years ago, Wagstaff proposed an-
other sweeping redefinition of hypnosis 
(Wagstaff, 1998), on which we provided a 
critical commentary (Woody & Sadler, 1998). 
Now he is proposing a new definition of hyp-
nosis (Wagstaff, this issue), and we are again 
providing a critical commentary.  It is like 
déjà vu all over again.
In some ways, Wagstaff’s new defini-
tion is strikingly different from his earlier 
one.  Indeed, it is surprising that he does 
not cite our earlier commentary, because in 
crucial ways he has adopted the position we 
proposed and abandoned his original posi-
tion that we critiqued.  For example, readers 
of Wagstaff (this issue) may be surprised to 
hear that Wagstaff (1998) was extremely crit-
ical of those who attempt to define hypnosis 
as an altered state.  Indeed, he argued that 
they were committing a basic logical error, 
called a category error.  In our critique, we 
explained why this criticism was itself not 
logically sound, and commented:
We respectfully reject the implicit reduc-
tionism in Wagstaff ’s characterization of 
an altered state in hypnosis as a category 
error.  Whatever the strengths and weak-
nesses of the altered-state notion turn out 
to be, it is not simply an error of logic to 
entertain it. (Woody & Sadler, 1998, p. 178) 
We are gratified to hear that after sixteen 
years, Wagstaff has adopted our position on 
this issue.
In addition, Wagstaff (1998) argued that 
the empirical evidence about hypnosis, such 
as neuroimaging, failed to demonstrate that 
hypnosis evokes a unique brain state, and 
thus, on empirical grounds (as well as logical 
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ones), hypnosis should not be regarded as an 
altered state.  In response, we pointed out 
that this was setting the bar impossibly high, 
in that almost no well-recognized psycholog-
ical states are associated with a unique brain-
activation signature.  Further, we commented 
that Wagstaff (1998) 
defines hypnosis as any suggestion that 
one is “entering a special state . .  . we call 
‘hypnosis’” (Wagstaff, 1998, p.  159), such 
that “if you can convince people that they 
have been ‘hypnotized’ then they have” 
(p. 161).   Wagstaff does not equate the be-
lief that one is hypnotized with an altered 
state of consciousness: “whether they are 
actually in or out of, or have been in an 
‘altered state of consciousness’ . . . is an ir-
relevance” (p. 161).  But the belief that one 
is hypnotized is itself an altered state of 
consciousness — that is, a state of aware-
ness that one clearly did not have prior to 
hypnosis. (Woody & Sadler, 1998, p. 179)
In other words, we argued that people’s belief 
that they are in a state of hypnosis is sufficient 
to infer that they are in an altered state.  We 
are gratified to find that Wagstaff has adopt-
ed our position on this issue as well.
Despite these changes, in other respects 
Wagstaff’s old and new definitions of hypno-
sis are essentially the same.  Indeed, some of 
the criticisms we made of Wagstaff (1998) still 
apply equally well to Wagstaff (this issue).  For 
example, with regard to Wagstaff (1998), we 
pointed out that “we do not find in his view 
any particularly consistent perspective on 
whether hypnosis is a state of consciousness, 
and whether it is ‘altered’ or not” (Woody & 
Sadler, 1998, p. 179).  At first blush, Wagstaff 
(this issue) seems to espouse a clearer position; 
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for example, in his foreword, he states, “re-
gardless of one’s theoretical perspective, the 
concept of an altered state should be a core 
feature of any definition of hypnosis” (p. 90). 
We strongly agree with this bold position 
and wish he had left it at that.  However, later 
in his article he states that he “aims to remain 
relatively non-committal as to the actual ex-
istence of such an altered state, or whether 
it is useful to postulate the existence of one” 
(p. 102).  As a result of this kind of hedging, 
his proposed definition of hypnosis is an 
awkward combination of different things. 
This can be illustrated by using his syntax to 
“define” something else, such as obesity:
Obesity can be defined as 1) an alleged al-
tered state of weight . . . or 2) acceptance 
of the suggestion that one is in such a 
condition.
As this illustration suggests, a definition of 
this form is probably muddling things that 
are distinct (what is alleged versus what is 
versus what is believed).
In our previous commentary, we also 
criticized Wagstaff’s reliance on what 
we termed the “rhetoric of nothing-but.” 
Wagstaff (1998) argued that rather than be-
ing anything particularly complex, hypnosis 
was simply the “suggestion that we are, will 
be, or have been, in a special condition we 
call hypnosis” (p. 160).  Similarly, Wagstaff 
(this issue) argues that a sufficient condition 
for hypnosis is an “acceptance of the sugges-
tion that one is in such a condition” (p. 104). 
This unidimensional (and rather circular) 
thinking seems too simplistic.  Over the 
years we have repeatedly pointed to a wide 
array of evidence that hypnosis is a complex 
amalgam of social experiences and cultural 
expectations, individual differences in mul-
tiple underlying abilities, and important 
contextual factors (e.g., Woody & Barnier, 
2008; Woody, Bowers, & Oakman, 1992; 
Woody & McConkey, 2003; Woody & Sadler, 
1999).  It cannot be reduced to one thing (i.e., 
the belief that one is in an altered state).
Finally, we strongly agree with Wagstaff’s 
reservations about the 2003 definition of 
hypnosis by the American Psychological 
Association Division of Psychological 
Hypnosis (Green, Barabasz, Barrett, & 
Montgomery, 2005).  Indeed, in our com-
mentary article on this definition (Woody & 
Sadler, 2005), we advanced some very similar 
points.  However, Wagstaff’s presently pro-
posed replacement for the APA definition 
inadvertently perpetuates what we identi-
fied as a serious error in the APA definition. 
Specifically, consider the following line from 
Wagstaff’s (this issue) proposed definition: 
A hypnosis procedure will typically in-
volve an introduction to the procedure 
during which the subject is told that sug-
gestions for imaginative experiences will 
be presented. (p. 104)
On the contrary, as we pointed out previ-
ously (Woody & Sadler, 2005), no commonly 
used hypnotic introductions and inductions, 
including those used in the Stanford scales 
and their derivatives, refer to imagination 
or anything “imaginative.”  Thus, it is not 
true that this is what a hypnosis procedure 
“typically” involves.  More importantly, 
the link of hypnosis with imagination is 
disconfirmed by the single most consistent 
and interesting finding from neuroimag-
ing research on hypnosis: In the patterns of 
brain activity evoked, hypnotically suggest-
ed phenomena are readily distinguishable 
from imagined events, whereas they closely 
resemble real events.  Szechtman, Woody, 
Bowers, & Nahmias (1998) first showed this 
for auditory hallucinations, and since then, 
using this design contrasting the three con-
ditions, the same pattern has been shown 
for a wide range of other important types of 
hypnotic suggestion (Woody & Szechtman, 
2012).  In short, it is empirically problematic 
to define hypnosis as akin to “imaginative 
experiences.”
To conclude, defining hypnosis is a dif-
ficult task, and we commend Wagstaff for 
grappling with it and raising tough issues. 
We would like to think of his latest efforts as 
a work in progress, and we look forward to 
seeing how his definition may have evolved 
in another 16 years.
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